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Third Party Participation in 
Investment-Environment Disputes: 
Recent Developments
Kyla Tienhaara
This article outlines recent developments in investor–
State dispute settlement related to the participation
of third parties in arbitration. A particular focus is
given to third party participation in disputes with a
clear public interest based on the relevance of the cases
to the protection of the environment, or sustainable
development more generally. The beneﬁts and draw-
backs of third party participation and the relationship
of participation to broader issues of transparency are
also brieﬂy discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the incidence of investor–State disputes
has risen signiﬁcantly1 and with this rise has come a
corresponding increase in the level of public interest
in these disputes, and the institutions that facilitate
their resolution. This latter development is a conse-
quence of not only the greater frequency of disputes,
but also of increased public awareness and heightened
concern about the broader implications of these disputes.
Marshall and Mann outline ﬁve reasons why there is a
clear public interest in investor–State disputes:
(1) disputes often arise in public service sectors such
as water, oil and gas, transport, waste disposal
and telecommunications;
(2) disputes may concern government regulation
aimed at the protection of public welfare (human
rights, health and safety, labour laws, environ-
mental protection);
(3) the threat of a dispute may have a ‘chilling’ effect
on government policy;
(4) arbitration is costly and has implications for the
public purse; and
(5) case law may determine the future development
of investment law, which in turn may have impli-
cations for other public-interest cases.2
Despite the compelling rationale that investor–State
disputes have a strong public-interest nature, the arbi-
tration procedures that govern the resolution of such
disputes are based on the model of private ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm
arbitration, which was designed with the protection of
commercial interests in mind. As such, arbitration has
traditionally been conﬁdential. Consequently, there are
generally no requirements for investor–State disputes
to be made known to the public, or any provisions for
public access to documents and awards produced in
the course of the arbitration. The Secretariat of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), the most commonly used arbitration
institution in investor–State cases, does keep a registry
of all cases ﬁled under its rules, and also publishes the
awards on its website if neither party to the dispute
objects.3 However, other arbitration institutions, such
as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), do
not have such a public register and cases resolved
under ad hoc mechanisms of dispute resolution are
only kept track of in an ad hoc manner by interested
academics and lawyers.4
There is also no tradition of involving non-disputant
third parties in arbitration. The most common means
of third party participation in other international
tribunals is through the submission of amicus curiae
(‘friend of the court’) briefs. Amicus curiae submis-
sions generally contain ‘supplementary information
1 See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor–State Dispute
Settlement, IIA Monitor No 4 (UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2005/2, 2005),
available at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webiteiit20052_en.pdf>.
This report suggests that there was a significant surge in numbers
of  disputes in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which may now be
tailing off.
2 F. Marshall and H. Mann, Revision of  the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, Good Governance and the Rule of  Law: Express Rules for
Investor–State Arbitrations Required (International Institute for
Sustainable Development, 2006), available at <http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2006/investment_uncitral_rules_rrevision.pdf>.
3 See the website available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid>.
4 Three websites in particular are excellent sources of  information
on arbitration cases: <http://www.investmentclaims.com>, <http://
www.naftaclaims.com> and <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/>. The govern-
ments of  Canada and the USA also have websites that provide
access to documents and decisions in NAFTA cases: <http://www.
dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-en.asp> and <http://www.
state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm>.
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on the case, particularly the occurrence of events or
technicalities relating to the subject at hand’.5 Amici
are different from expert witnesses, which can be
called on in the course of a proceeding, as they are
not remunerated for their services and they are in no
contractual relationship to the arbitration parties.6
While historically there has been no role for amici
in investor–State disputes, in recent years a trend of
such participation has been emerging. The precedent7
for such participation was set within the context of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),8 but
the idea has also spread to bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) negotiated by Canada and the USA, and
was incorporated into the new ICSID Rules in 2006.
This article outlines these developments and traces the
recent history of third party participation in investor–
State disputes related to the environment or sustain-
able development more generally. At the same time,
it also addresses some of the other changes that have
occurred which have resulted in increased trans-
parency in the arbitration system. The issue of trans-
parency and third party participation are intimately
linked. Without public knowledge of the existence of
disputes, amici will be precluded from making sub-
missions. Furthermore, it can be argued that without
access to relevant documents and to the proceedings,
third parties will be incapable of formulating effective
and worthwhile submissions.
BREAKING NEW GROUND: 
METHANEX AND THE NAFTA 
NOTES OF INTERPRETATION
Previous issues of this publication have reported on
both the substantive aspects of the Methanex Corp. v.
United States of America case and the speciﬁc decision
on the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs.9 As such,
despite the importance of the Methanex Tribunal deci-
sion, it will only be brieﬂy reviewed here, allowing for
more discussion of post-Methanex developments in
arbitration practice.
The Methanex case revolved around a Californian ban
of a gasoline additive (methyl tertiary butyl ether or
MTBE), a potential groundwater contaminant that
also poses signiﬁcant health risks. Methanex Corp., a
Canadian company, ﬁled a claim under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA and sought compensation of US$970 million.
The dispute was resolved under the ad hoc arbitration
rules of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
In 2000, two requests for permission to ﬁle amicus
curiae briefs, to make oral submissions and have
observer status at oral hearings were made by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).10 The respondent
State in the case (the USA) and the claimant both ﬁled
submissions responding to the petitioners’ requests,
as did the non-disputing parties of NAFTA (Canada
and Mexico).11 The claimant and Mexico opposed the
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs, while both Canada
and the USA showed support. The USA also indicated
its willingness to open the proceedings and to disclose
documents to the public.
In a groundbreaking decision, the Tribunal concluded
that it had the power to accept amicus curiae submis-
sions, but no power to authorize access to materials
or to allow the petitioners to attend hearings.12 The
Tribunal found that Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL
Rules, which states that ‘the arbitral tribunal may con-
duct the arbitration in such manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each
party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case’,
provided it with the discretion to accept amicus curiae
submissions.13 However, the Tribunal made it clear
that UNCITRAL, Rule 25(4), which requires hearings
to be private unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
limits the ﬂexibility of Article 15(1). Furthermore,
while indicating that it was minded to accept amicus
curiae submissions in this case, the Tribunal chose to
delay its ﬁnal decision until the later stages of the
dispute. It is clear that one of the reasons why the
Tribunal was minded to accept briefs was because it
was felt that this would improve the public image of
investment arbitration:
5 O. Bennaim-Selvi, ‘Third Parties in International Investment
Arbitrations: A Trend in Motion’, 6:5 Journal of  World Investment
and Trade (2005), 773, at 786.
6 L. Mistelis, ‘Confidentiality and Third Party Participation’, 21:2
Arbitration International (2005), 211, at 231.
7 The term ‘precedent’ is used here very loosely, as there is no
formal stare decisis in investment arbitration.
8 North American Free Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Mexico, Washington,
17 December 1992).
9 S. Saha, ‘Methanex Corporation and the USA: The Final NAFTA
Tribunal Ruling’, 15:1 RECIEL (2006), 110; H. Mann, ‘Opening the
Doors, At Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in
Methanex v. United States’, 10:2 RECIEL (2001), 241.
10 Petition to the Arbitral Tribunal of  the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (25 August 2000), available at <http://
www.iisd.org/pdf/methanex_petition_sept72000.pdf>, and Amended
Petition of  Communities for a Better Environment, the Bluewater
Network of  the Earth Island Institute, and the Center for Inter-
national Environmental Law to Appear Jointly as Amici Curiae (13
October 2000), available at <http://www.earthjustice.org/library/
legal_docs/Methanex.pdf>.
11 Under NAFTA, n. 8 above, Article 1128 non-disputing State parties
may make submissions to arbitral tribunals on the interpretation of
the treaty.
12 Methanex Corp. v. United States of  America, Decision of  the
Tribunal on Petitions from Third Parties to Intervene as ‘Amici
Curiae’ (15 January 2001), at para. 47, available at <http://
www.investmentclaims.com>.
13 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL, 1976), available at
<http://www.uncitral.org/>.
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[the] arbitral process could beneﬁt from being perceived as
more open or transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen
as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal’s willingness
to receive amicus submissions might support the process in
general and this arbitration in particular; whereas a blanket
refusal could do positive harm.14
On 7 October 2003, the Free Trade Commission (FTC)
of NAFTA, made up of representatives of the three
NAFTA countries, issued a statement on third party
participation in Chapter 11 disputes.15 The statement
stipulated that any non-disputing party that is a person
of a party (a NAFTA State), or that has a signiﬁcant
presence in the territory of a party, could apply for
leave to ﬁle a submission. The statement also outlined
guidelines for the acceptance of such submissions.
According to these guidelines, in the application for
amicus status, the person or organization should dis-
close any afﬁliations or ﬁnancial ties to either party in
the dispute, indicate the nature of their interest in the
dispute, and provide reasoning as to why the tribunal
should accept the submission. Furthermore, the
guidelines suggest that the tribunal, when making its
decision, should consider ‘the extent to which’:
• the non-disputing party submission would assist
the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or
legal issue related to the arbitration by bringing a
perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is
different from that of the disputing parties;
• the non-disputing party submission would address
matters within the scope of the dispute;
• the non-disputing party has a signiﬁcant interest in
the arbitration; and
• there is a public interest in the subject matter of
the arbitration.
Shortly after the FTC statement was issued, Methanex
Corp. wrote to the Tribunal, on behalf of both disputing
parties, to suggest that the Tribunal adopt the FTC
guidelines for the acceptance of amicus curiae submis-
sions. The Tribunal did so in January of the following year
and issued a press release outlining the procedures to
be followed by potential amici. The original petitioners
submitted their briefs in March 2004.16
The proceedings of the Methanex case were also even-
tually opened to the public, but only with the consent
of both parties. As a result, the amici became aware of
the fact that the US was defending the measure in
question only on the grounds of the need to protect
public health. In June 2004, the International Institute
for Sustainable Development jointly with Bluewater
Network, Communities for a Better Environment
and the Centre for International Environmental Law
petitioned for the right to submit a post-hearing
submission to argue that the measure should also be
considered as an environmental one. The claimant
opposed that application and the Tribunal declined to
accept the brief.
In the same period as the Methanex case was transpir-
ing, another (NAFTA/UNCITRAL) tribunal in the case
UPS v. Canada17 also found that it had the power to
accept amicus briefs, and more recently the (NAFTA/
UNCITRAL) tribunal in Glamis Gold Ltd v. United
States of America18 has also done so (see further
below).
THE CANADIAN AND 
AMERICAN ‘RE-MODELLED’ 
BITS
Despite the prevalence of BITs (there are now nearly
2500 worldwide and almost every country has negoti-
ated at least one such treaty),19 these treaties have
received far less attention in academia than regional
agreements such as NAFTA or (failed) attempts at
developing a multilateral agreement on investment.
However, BITs are increasingly recognized as having
important implications, particularly for developing
countries, including with regard to the regulation of
the environment.
Many countries have taken up the practice of producing
what is called a ‘model’ or ‘prototype’ BIT; a template
that is used in negotiations. Actual BITs tend to follow
these models quite closely, with only minor changes.
In 2003 and 2004 respectively, the Governments of
Canada and the USA released new versions of their
model BITs.20
14 See Methanex Corp. v. United States of  America, n. 12 above, at para. 49.
15 Statement of  the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing
Party Participation, Celebrating NAFTA at Ten, NAFTA Commission
Meeting Joint Statement, Montreal (7 October 2003), available at
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Nondisputing-en.pdf>.
16 Submission of  Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater Network, Com-
munities for a Better Environment and Center For International
Environmental Law (9 March 2004), available at <http://www.
ciel.org/Publications/MethanexAmicusSubmission_Mar04.pdf>, and
Amicus Curiae Submission by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (9 March 2004), available at <http://
www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade_methanex_submissions.pdf>.
17 Documents and decisions from the proceedings of  this case are
available at <http://www.naftaclaims.com>.
18 This case is ongoing. Documents and decisions from the pro-
ceedings of  this case are available at <http://www.naftaclaims.com>.
19 Not all BITs have entered into force. UNCTAD estimates that of
the 2495 BITs concluded prior to 2006, 1891 (i.e. 75.8%) had
entered into force. See UNCTAD, The Entry into Force of  Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), IIA Monitor No 3 (UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/
IIA/2006/9, 2006), available at <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
webiteiia20069_en.pdf>.
20 In Canada, BITs are called Foreign Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreements (FIPAs). The Canadian model FIPA is
available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/
2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf>. The US Model BIT is available at <http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/29030.doc>.
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The Canadian Government had been a strong propo-
nent of permitting third party participation in NAFTA
Chapter 11 disputes, and the government website
notes that ‘[one] of the most signiﬁcant improve-
ments’ made in the new model BIT is the ‘institution-
alization’ of amicus curiae submissions.21 The model
follows the NAFTA FTC guidelines on amicus curiae
submissions quite closely.22 The model also stipulates
that hearings will be open to the public and that all
documents and awards will be freely available (with
certain limits to protect conﬁdential information).23
The US Model BIT has a less detailed provision, which
states that ‘[t]he tribunal shall have the authority to
accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a
person or entity that is not a disputing party’.24 The
model also provides public access to all documents
and awards and open proceedings.25 These provisions
have already been incorporated into the US-Chile Free
Trade Agreement,26 the US-Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement,27 the US-Morocco
Free Trade Agreement,28 the US-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement,29 the US-Uruguay BIT,30 the US-Columbia
Trade Promotion Agreement31 and the US-Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement.32
ICSID’S RULES, OLD AND 
NEW
In 2006, ICSID updated its Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings.33 Changes to two rules in
particular are relevant to the issues of third party
participation and transparency. The most signiﬁcant
change was to Rule 37 (Visits and Inquiries), where a
second paragraph was added stipulating that:
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a per-
son or entity that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule
called the ‘non-disputing party’) to ﬁle a written submission
with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the
dispute. In determining whether to allow such a ﬁling, the
Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to
which:
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the
Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue
related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective,
particular knowledge or insight that is different from
that of the disputing parties;
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a
matter within the scope of the dispute;
(c) the non-disputing party has a signiﬁcant interest in the
proceeding.
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party sub-
mission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden
or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are
given an opportunity to present their observations on the
non-disputing party submission.
Rule 32 (Oral Procedure) was also slightly modiﬁed.
Paragraph 2 now states that:
Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary-General, may allow other persons,
besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates,
witnesses and experts during their testimony, and ofﬁcers
of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the
hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements.
The Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for
the protection of proprietary or privileged information.
However, the modiﬁcation from the wording of the
former Rule, which stated ‘The Tribunal shall decide,
with the consent of the parties’ to the new wording of
‘Unless either party objects’ is, in practice, very lim-
ited. The bottom line is that not all proceedings will be
opened to the public under the new Rules.
Prior to the change in the Rules, there were several
cases that dealt with the issue of third party participa-
tion, and since their adoption there has been a further
case in which NGOs have petitioned for amicus curiae
status.
DECISIONS ON THIRD PARTY 
PARTICIPATION UNDER THE OLD 
ICSID RULES
Several cases involving water privatizations in South
America have dealt with the issue of amicus curiae
submissions under the old ICSID Rules.
21 See the website available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/
what_fipa-en.asp#structure>.
22 Agreement between Canada and __________ for the Promotion
and Protection of  Investments in Canadian model FIPA, n. 20 above,
at Article 39.
23 Ibid., Article 38.
24 Treaty between the Government of  the United States of  America
and the Government of  [Country] Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment in US model BIT, n. 20
above, Article 28(3).
25 Ibid., Article 29.
26 US-Chile Free Trade Agreement (Miami, 6 June 2003), Articles
10.19 and 10.20.
27 US-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(Washington, 5 August 2004), Articles 10.20 and 10.21.
28 US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (Washington, 15 June 2004),
Articles 10.19 and 10.20.
29 US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (Washington, 6 May, 2003),
Articles 15.19 and 15.20.
30 US-Uruguay BIT (Mar del Plata, 4 November 2005), Articles 28
and 29.
31 US-Columbia Trade Promotion Agreement (Washington, 22 November
2006), Articles 10.20 and 10.21.
32 US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Washington, 12 April 2006),
Articles 10.20 and 10.21.
33 Rules of  Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules)
in ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules (ICSID, April 2006),
available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm>.
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The ﬁrst was Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of
Bolivia. This case dealt with the highly publicized and
highly controversial case of the privatization of water
services in the City of Cochabamba in Bolivia. After a
40-year concession was awarded to the company
Aguas del Tunari (a subsidiary of Bechtel Corporation)
water prices sky-rocketed, leading to widespread pub-
lic protest. In 2000, the company abandoned the
project and in 2001 ﬁled a request for arbitration with
ICSID.34
In 2002, several organizations and individuals peti-
tioned for amicus curiae status, requesting permission
to make submissions as well as the right to attend all
hearings, to make oral presentations, to have immedi-
ate access to all submissions made to the Tribunal,
and to respond to arguments made by either party.35
In addition, the petitioners requested that the pro-
ceedings be opened to the public, and that there be
public disclosure of the submissions to the Tribunal.
Finally, they requested that the Tribunal visit
Cochabamba and hold public hearings concerning the
facts underlying the claim.
The arbitrators unanimously decided that it was
beyond their authority to grant the request.36 Absent
agreement of the parties, the Tribunal reasoned that it
could not open the proceedings or provide access to
documents. Furthermore, the Tribunal in its decision
stated that it did not see the need to request sub-
missions from third parties at that particular point in
the case. The dispute was settled and the arbitration
proceedings were discontinued at the mutual request
of the parties on 28 March 2006.
In two cases currently pending against Argentina, the
openness of ICSID Tribunals to amicus curiae briefs
has also been tested. The cases, which relate to sewage
and water distribution services, concern the govern-
ment’s freeze of public utility rates following the
abandonment in 2001 of the system that pegged
Argentina’s currency to the dollar. In 2005, ﬁve NGOs
ﬁled a petition in the case of Suez, Sociedad General
de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal,
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (‘Suez/Vivendi’).37
In June of the same year, in a second case – Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and
InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The
Argentine Republic (‘Suez/InterAguas’) – one NGO
and three individuals ﬁled a similar petition.38 In both
cases, the Tribunal was made up of the same mem-
bers, and the orders in response to the petitions are
substantively similar.
In both cases, the Tribunal determined that the peti-
tioners’ request was composed of three parts: ﬁrst that
they, and the public at large, should be allowed access
to the hearings in the case; second that they should be
allowed the opportunity to present legal arguments as
amicus curiae; and ﬁnally that they should be allowed
access to documents and other information on the
case.39 In both cases, the claimants asked the Tribunal
to reject the petition while the respondent State
(Argentina) made no objection.
The Tribunal determined ﬁrst that it was not able to
open the hearings to third parties or to the public
because of the requirement under ICSID Arbitration
Rule 32(2) for the consent of both parties; in both the
Methanex and the UPS cases there was explicit con-
sent to open the hearings, but in these cases it was
lacking.40 Next, the Tribunal moved on to the issue of
amicus curiae and determined that it did have the
authority to accept briefs. Interestingly, in its explana-
tion of this decision, the Tribunal noted that:
The acceptance of amicus submissions would have the addi-
tional desirable consequence of increasing the transparency
34 ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of
Bolivia, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (21
October 2005), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
adt_en.pdf>.
35 ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Petition of  La Coordinadora Para la
Defensa del Agua y Vida, La Federacion Departmental Cocha-
bamba de Organizaciones Regantes, Sempa Sur, Friends of  the
Earth Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Ferdandez, Father Luis
Sanchez, and Congressman Jorge Alvarado to the Arbitral Tribunal
in Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of  Bolivia (29 August 2002),
available at <http://www.investmentclaims.com>.
36 See the letter from the president of  the Tribunal responding to the
petition in ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v.
Republic of  Bolivia (29 January 2003), available at <http://
www.investmentclaims.com>.
37 ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae of  Centro de Estudios Legales y
Sociales, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia, Consumidores
Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción
Comunitaria, Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores, and Center for
International Environmental Law in Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine
Republic (27 January 2005), unofficial translation from Spanish
original available at <http://www.cels.org.ar/english/index.html>.
38 ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Petición de Participación como
Amicus Curiae (Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae) of
Fundación para el Desarrollo Sustentable, Professor Ricardo
Ignacio Beltramino, Dr Ana María Herren, and Dr Omar Darío
Heffes in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and
InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine
Republic (21 June 2005).
39 ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v.
The Argentine Republic (Suez/InterAguas), Order in Response to a
Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (17 March 2006),
available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0317-AC-
en.pdf> and ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Suez, Sociedad General
de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The
Argentine Republic (Suez/Vivendi ), Order in Response to a Petition
for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May
2005), available at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/
12_Amicus_Curiae_03-19_e.pdf>.
40 See ibid., paras 6–7 in both Orders.
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of investor–state arbitration. Public acceptance of the le-
gitimacy of international arbitral processes, particularly
when they involve states and matters of public interest, is
strengthened by increased openness and increased know-
ledge as to how these processes function. It is this imper-
ative that has led to increased transparency in the arbitral
processes of the World Trade Organization and the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Through the participation
of appropriate representatives of civil society in appropriate
cases, the public will gain increased understanding of
ICSID processes.41
In the Suez/Vivendi case, the Tribunal set out condi-
tions by which the NGOs could apply for leave to make
submissions, and in the Suez/InterAguas case the
Tribunal determined that the petitioners had not met
those same conditions, but could provide the Tribunal
with further information in order to do so. In both
cases, the decision as to whether to provide the peti-
tioners with access to documents was deferred until
leave was granted to ﬁle amicus curiae briefs.
In December 2006, the petitioners in the Suez/Vivendi
case ﬁled with the Tribunal a second petition,42 again
requesting the opportunity to submit a written amicus
submission, as well as to be given access to documents.
The claimant asked the Tribunal to reject the petition,
while the respondent State made no objection.
In February 2007, the Tribunal made its Order in
response to the petition.43 Following the guidelines
that it had laid out in its initial Order in 2005, the
Tribunal ﬁrst assessed the suitability of the petitioners
to act as amici, based on their expertise, experience
and independence. It found that the NGOs had pro-
vided sufﬁcient information to prove that they met
these criteria. The Tribunal also found that there was
a sufﬁcient public interest in the case to justify third
party participation. Finally, it found that the submission
would not unduly impede the proceedings, although it
did restrict the petitioners to a 30-page brief. Turning
next to the issue of access to documents, the Tribunal
noted that even the new ICSID Rules (which in any
case did not apply to this case) provided no guidance
on this issue. The Tribunal noted that:
As a general proposition, an amicus curiae must have
sufﬁcient information on the subject matter of the dispute
to provide ‘perspectives, expertise and arguments’ which are
pertinent and thus likely to be of assistance to the Tribunal.
Otherwise the entire exercise serves no purpose.44
However, the Tribunal went on to suggest that in this
particular case, the petitioners appeared to have
access to sufﬁcient information that was available in
the public domain, and were therefore capable of
making a useful brief without further access to arbitral
documents. The Tribunal emphasized in this respect
that the proper role of an amicus curiae ‘is not to
challenge arguments or evidence put forward by the
parties’ but to ‘provide their perspective, expertise,
and arguments to help the court’.45 The Petitioners
made their submission in April 2007.46
TESTING THE WATER: BIWATER 
AND THE APPLICATION OF  THE 
NEW ICSID RULES
The Biwater Gauff Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania
case is also worth reviewing, as it displays some of the
limitations of the changes to ICSID’s Rules, as well as
the tension between transparency and conﬁdentiality
in proceedings.
In 2005, the Government of Tanzania cancelled a
10-year contract of the private utility City Water,
owned by British company Biwater. The contract was
to supply water to the country’s commercial capital,
Dar es Salaam. The government claimed that the reason
for the cancellation was that the residents have had to
cope with erratic supplies and water shortages.47 In
August of 2005, the company ﬁled a request for arbi-
tration based on a UK-Tanzania BIT and under ICSID
Rules. By the time that the case had begun, the new
ICSID Rules had come into effect and the Tribunal
determined that they would govern the proceedings.
The Tribunal’s ﬁrst session began in March 2006.
In July of that year, Biwater wrote a letter to the
Tribunal claiming that the Government of Tanzania
41 See Suez/InterAguas, n. 39 above, at para. 21 and Suez/Vivendi,
n. 39 above, at para. 22.
42 ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Petition for Permission to Make an
Amicus Curiae Submission of  Centro de Estudios Legales y
Sociales, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia,
Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios
de Acción Comunitaria, Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores, and
Center for International Environmental Law in Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v.
The Argentine Republic (Suez/Vivendi ) (1 December 2006),
unofficial translation from Spanish original available at <http://
www.cels.org.ar/english/index.html>.
43 ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas
de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine
Republic, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-
Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus
Curiae Submission (12 February 2007), available at <http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/ARB0319_ORDER.pdf>.
44 Ibid., at para. 24.
45 Ibid., at para. 25.
46 ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Amicus Curiae Submission of  Centro
de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y
la Justicia, Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de
Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores,
and Center for International Environmental Law in Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v.
The Argentine Republic (4 April 2007), available at <http://
www.ciel.org/Publications/SUEZ_Amicus_English_4Apr07.pdf>.
47 ‘Tanzania Ditches Private Water Supplier’, BBC News (18 May 2005),
available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4558725.stm>.
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had unilaterally disclosed certain orders made by the
Tribunal to an ‘unrelated’ third party.48 Subsequently,
certain documents (a Procedural Order and the Minutes
of the First Session) were published on the Internet.
According to Biwater, the dispute was attracting pub-
lic interest, which had led to, for example, a campaign
by the World Development Movement (an NGO based
in London) to discontinue the proceedings. In a second
letter, the company ﬁled a request to the Tribunal for
provisional measures on conﬁdentiality (‘the Request’).49
The Request, which according to the company was
based on the need to preserve the procedural integrity
of the proceedings and to avoid aggravation or exacer-
bation of the dispute, called for the following:
• discussion on a case-by-case basis of the publication
of all Decisions other than the Award (if mutual
agreement cannot be reached then Tribunal should
make the decision);
• no disclosure of the pleadings to third parties;
• no disclosure of any documents produced in the ﬁrst
and second rounds of disclosure to third parties;
• no disclosure of any correspondence between the
parties and/or the Tribunal in respect of the arbi-
tral proceedings to third parties.
The Tribunal noted that Biwater considered these
measures to be necessary as they go to the company’s
‘ability to rely on the private nature of the oral hearings,
and its ability to present its case and accompanying
evidence without the threat of increased harassment
and interference from third parties’.50
In its Decision on Provisional Measures, the Tribunal
noted that what was required was ‘a careful balancing
between two competing interests: the need for trans-
parency and the need to protect the procedural integr-
ity of the arbitration’.51 It commented that ‘[w]ithout
doubt, there is now a marked tendency towards trans-
parency in treaty arbitration’, which is reﬂected in the
changes to ICSID’s Rules.52 The Tribunal reasoned
that the provisions that continue to limit the publica-
tion of documents apply to the actions of the ICSID
Secretariat, rather than to the parties themselves.
However, it also agreed with Biwater that ‘the prose-
cution of a dispute in the media or in other public fora,
or the uneven reporting and disclosure of documents
or other parts of the record in parallel with a pending
arbitration, may aggravate or exacerbate the dispute
and may impact the integrity of the procedure’.53
Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that placing
restrictions on disclosure for the duration of the dis-
pute is not necessarily inconsistent with the objective
of transparency, as these restrictions can be removed
upon the conclusion of the dispute.54
The Tribunal determined that decisions on the pub-
lication of certain documents during the proceedings
(decisions, orders or directions) would be made on a
case-by-case basis. Minutes or records of hearings
would not be disclosed unless agreed by both parties
or directed by the Tribunal, and furthermore any
documents produced by one party would not be dis-
closed by the opposing party (the parties were per-
mitted to release their own documents). Pleadings,
written memorials, witness statements and expert
reports (which could all contain details of the contents
of other non-disclosed documents) would also be kept
conﬁdential pending the conclusion of the proceed-
ings. Finally, correspondence between the parties
and/or the Tribunal would also be kept conﬁdential as
these documents ‘will usually concern the very conduct
of the process itself, rather than issues of substance,
and as such do not warrant wider distribution’.55 The
Tribunal emphasized that parties were permitted to
‘engage in general discussion about the case in public’
as long as this was ‘restricted to what is necessary’ and
not used to ‘antagonize’ or ‘unduly pressure’ the other
party or exacerbate the dispute, or make the resolution
of the dispute more difﬁcult.
In November 2006, ﬁve NGOs (three Tanzanian and
two international) petitioned for amicus curiae status
in this case.56 In doing so, they referred to the deci-
sions in the Suez/Vivendi and Suez/InterAguas cases
on the criteria for accepting such petitions, and also
to the new ICSID Rule 37(2). In the ‘Reasons for the
Petition’ section, they argued that the arbitration
‘raises a number of issues of vital concern to the local
community in Tanzania, and a wide range of potential
issues of concern to developing countries’ and ‘also
raises issues from a broader sustainable development
perspective and is potentially of relevance for the
entire international community’.57
Interestingly, the petitioners appear to have anticipated
some of the possible objections to their participation
in the dispute, pointing out that by acting together
48 ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Biwater Gauff  Ltd v. United Republic
of  Tanzania, Procedural Order No 3 (29 September 2006), available
at <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/arb0522_procedural_
order3.pdf>.
49 The letter dated 17 July 2006 is referred to in Procedural Order
No 3, ibid.
50 See Biwater Gauff  Ltd v. United Republic of  Tanzania, ibid., at
para. 38.
51 Ibid., at para. 112.
52 Ibid., at para. 114.
53 Ibid., at para. 136.
54 Ibid., at para. 140.
55 Ibid., at para. 161.
56 Petition for Amicus Curiae Status of  the Lawyers’ Environmental
Action Team, the Legal and Human Rights Centre, the Tanzania
Gender Networking Programme, the Center for International
Environmental Law and the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (27 November 2006), at 7, available at <http://
www.ciel.org/Publications/Tanzania_Amicus_1Dec06.pdf>.
57 Ibid., at 7.
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they had reduced the burden of additional amicus
curiae submissions on the proceedings. The petitioners
also argued, however, that without greater transparency
in the proceedings, it would not be possible for them
to participate meaningfully, nor would it be possible
for the Tribunal to even determine whether they
passed the amicus curiae test provided by the ICSID
Rules:
. . . it is not possible for the Petitioners to fulﬁl all the con-
ditions necessary to allow the Tribunal to fully apply this
test. The reason for this impossibility is the impact of the
conﬁdentiality order contained in Procedural Order No. 3
of the Tribunal. By precluding the release to the public of
the documents that detail the facts and legal issues in dis-
pute, the Petitioners cannot describe the scope of their
intended legal submissions, and hence the extent to which
the tests set out in Rule 37(2) are fully met.58
The petitioners, therefore, suggested that the Tribunal
could either accept the petition and provide them with
the legal documents needed to make a submission, or
provide them with the legal documents in order that
they might be able to prove that they meet the require-
ments of the amicus curiae test.
In response, the claimant argued that the petitioners
had mistakenly assumed that the issues that concern
them were of relevance to the arbitration simply
because the case related to water.59 The claimant dis-
agreed that environmental issues and issues of sus-
tainable development were in fact relevant to the case.
The Tribunal’s decision on amicus was given in February
2007.60 In line with previous decisions, submissions
were allowed but access to documents and hearings
were not. The Tribunal reasoned that the petitioners
had ‘a sufﬁcient interest’ in the proceeding, and that
their submission had the potential to assist the Tribunal
in the proceedings, by providing a perspective or know-
ledge that was different from that of the disputing
parties. The Tribunal also noted ‘that allowing for the
making of such submission by these entities in these
proceedings is an important element in the overall
discharge of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate, and in
securing wider conﬁdence in the arbitral process
itself’.61 In terms of access to documents, the Tribunal
suggested that the dispute had been very public and
widely reported, and that the ‘broad policy issues’ that
the petitioners would address in their brief did not
require access to documents from the arbitration.62
However, it was also noted that the issue might be
revisited in the future, given the fact that the limit-
ations on disclosure were put in place to preserve
‘procedural integrity’ and not necessarily to ensure
conﬁdentiality per se.63 Finally, with regard to the
request to open the proceedings, the Tribunal reasoned
that Rule 32(2) of the amended ICSID Arbitration
Rules was very clear on this matter. As the claimant
had voiced its objection to opening the proceedings,
the Tribunal had no option but to reject the request.64
UNCITRAL: ONE STEP 
FORWARD, TWO STEPS 
BACK?
Although it was under UNCITRAL Rules that the
Tribunal in Methanex ﬁrst determined that it had
the power to accept amicus curiae submissions, it is
important to remember that Article 15(1), which
provides this power, is ﬁrst of all discretionary, and is
second of all subordinated to other provisions in the
Rules (the requirements that hearings will be held in
camera unless the parties agree otherwise, and that
the award may only be made public with the consent
of both parties).65 Some observers argue that the
power to consider amicus curiae submissions should
be made explicit, mandatory and coupled with increased
transparency.66
At its thirty-ninth session (June/July 2006), UNCI-
TRAL agreed that its Working Group II on Inter-
national Arbitration and Conciliation should prioritize
the revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In
a note prepared by the Secretariat, several possible
amendments were contemplated. Of relevance here
are the following options for consideration: an express
provision on third party intervention; explicit rules
regarding the conﬁdentiality of the proceedings as
such, or of the materials (including pleadings) before
an arbitral tribunal; and whether the UNCITRAL
Rules should address the situation where a party is
under a legal duty to disclose an award or its tenor (for
example under access to information legislation). It
would seem from this note that it is possible that the
revision of UNCITRAL Rules could make them more,
or less, transparent.
In September of the same year, an unofﬁcial report
was released, authored by two investment arbitration
experts, with more speciﬁc recommendations for the
58 Ibid., at 11.
59 The claimant’s response is referred to in ICSID Case No ARB/05/
22, Biwater Gauff  Ltd v. United Republic of  Tanzania, Procedural
Order No 5 (2 February 2007), available at <http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/ARB0522_ProceduralOrdNo5.pdf>.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., at para. 50.
62 Ibid., at para. 65.
63 Ibid., at para. 66.
64 Ibid., at paras 70–72.
65 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, n. 13 above, Articles 25(4) and
32(5).
66 See F. Marshall and H. Mann, n. 2 above.
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revision of the Rules.67 In terms of the express provi-
sion on third party access, the report recommended
inserting a new Article 15(5) that would read:
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the Arbitral
Tribunal may, after having consulted with the parties, and
especially in cases raising issues of public interest, allow
any person who is not a party to the proceedings to present
one or more written statements, provided that the Tribunal
is satisﬁed that such statements are likely to assist it in the
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the pro-
ceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or
insight which the parties are unable to present. The Arbitral
Tribunal shall determine the mode and number of such
statements after consulting with the parties.68
With regard to the inclusion of an explicit conﬁdenti-
ality clause, the authors noted that there had been
substantial discussion on this issue during the revision
of the ICC Rules in 1998. In that case, it was decided
that a general clause should not be included and that
tribunals should make these decisions on a case-by-
case basis. However, with regard to the documents and
evidence produced in the course of the arbitration, the
authors did feel the need to propose a new clause,
which would state that:
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, all materials
in the proceedings which are not otherwise in the public
domain, including materials created for the purpose of the
arbitration and all other documents or evidence given by a
party, witness, expert, [or any other person,] shall be treat-
ed as conﬁdential, save and to the extent that disclosure
may be required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pur-
sue a legal right, and in bona ﬁde legal proceedings before
a state court or other judicial authority in relation to an
award.69
Finally, the report suggested an amendment to the
clause on the publication of the award to allow for
publication with the consent of both parties (as before)
or when ‘disclosure is required of a party by legal duty,
to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to
[bona ﬁde] legal proceedings before a State court or
other judicial authority’.70 This clearly does not go as
far as the ICSID Rules, where either party is permitted
to publish the award unilaterally.
Two NGOs, which have been involved as amici in
several investor–State disputes, have also made a
proposal to UNCITRAL, arguing that a separate set of
arbitration rules should be developed to govern dis-
putes that involve a State as a party. One of their sug-
gestions is that in this separate set of rules, acceptance
of amicus curiae briefs should be made explicit through
a new Article 15(4) along the lines of Article 37(2) of
the new ICSID Rules and the NAFTA FTC guidelines.71
The NGO report also strongly cautions against the
adoption of a conﬁdentiality clause, stating that in the
case of proceedings involving a State, such a clause
‘would ﬂy in the face of principles of good governance
and human rights, and thus undermine the credibility
and legitimacy of the arbitral proceedings’.72 Furthermore,
the report argues that such a restraint on transpar-
ency would render effective third party participation
impossible:
. . . a non-disputing party requesting leave to submit an
amicus curiae brief to a tribunal could not elaborate on
whether its perspective, knowledge or insight is different
from the disputing parties’ or useful to the tribunal, if the
record remains secret. Likewise, it would be impossible for
a non-disputing party to prepare a submission within the
scope of the dispute when access to pleadings is denied.73
In February 2007, member governments rejected the
idea of including a general provision on conﬁdentiality
in the UNCITRAL rules, but delayed the decision on
whether or not to develop a separate set of rules for
disputes involving States.74 The revision of the rules is
expected to be ﬁnalized in 2008.75
NOT ONLY FOR NGOs: 
GLAMIS GOLD AND THE 
PARTICIPATION OF BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS
It is important to understand that third party par-
ticipation is not restricted to environmental or other
advocacy groups. An ICSID discussion paper has
noted this, stating that ‘[t]here may well be cases where
the process could be strengthened by submissions of
third parties, not only civil society organizations but
also for instance business groups or, in investment
treaty arbitrations, the other States parties to the treaties
concerned’.76 A currently pending NAFTA Chapter 11
case (Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States of America)77
67 J. Paulsson and G. Petrochilos, Revision of  the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2006).
68 Ibid., at 72.
69 Ibid., at 79.
70 Ibid., at 135.
71 Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Revising
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to Address State Arbitrations
(CIEL/IISD, 2007), at 4, available at <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/
investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration.pdf.>.
72 Ibid., at 10.
73 Ibid.
74 ‘Governments Punt Discussion of  Special UNCITRAL Rules for
Investor–State Disputes’, Investment Treaty News (14 February
2007), available at <http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn>.
75 Ibid.
76 ICSID, Possible Improvements of  the Framework for ICSID
Arbitration: A Discussion Paper of  the ICSID Secretariat (ICSID,
2004).
77 See n. 18 above.
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surrounding reclamation requirements for open-pit
mines in the State of California illustrates this. Four
amicus curiae submissions have been ﬁled in this
case: the ﬁrst by the Quechan Indian Nation in August
2004; the second as a joint submission of two NGOs
(Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the Earth
United States) in September 2005; the third by the
National Mining Association in October 2006; and
the fourth as another joint submission of two NGOs
(Sierra Club and Earthworks) also in October 2006.78
The power of the Tribunal to accept amicus curiae
submissions was never in question, as the proceedings
began following the release of the NAFTA FTC guide-
lines on third party participation. What is worthy of
note about this case is rather that, for the ﬁrst time, a
business association (rather than a labour, environ-
mental or other social organization) requested permission
to submit a brief. The National Mining Association is
comprised of more than 325 corporations from the
American mining sector, and its purpose is to advocate
‘public policies designed to protect and expand domes-
tic mining opportunities that are of vital importance to
the United States’ economic prosperity and national
security’.79 While generally amicus curiae submissions
are thought to be impartial and intended to provide
‘perspective, expertise and arguments’ rather than
direct support for either party, the National Mining
Association application to ﬁle a submission states
outright that it is ‘in support of the Claimant’.80 The
Association also has direct ties with the claimant, as
Glamis Gold Ltd is an Association Member.
ARGUMENTS FOR AND 
AGAINST THIRD PARTY 
PARTICIPATION IN 
INVESTOR–STATE DISPUTES
Those that argue in favour of increased transparency
and third party participation suggest that due to the
public-interest nature of investor–State disputes, the
conﬁdentiality that applies to private ﬁrm–ﬁrm dis-
putes is inappropriate. As Legum notes, there are in
fact a number of different kinds of interest implicated
in investor–State disputes:
. . . speciﬁc interest in the measure that is challenged in the
case; general interest in the appropriate functioning of
the investment protections; interest in the domestic law
analogues of the treaty provision invoked [e.g. regulatory
takings]; interest in the appropriate interaction between
federal, state and local government authorities; and many
others.81
There are also several different types of ‘public’;
Mistelis argues that in addition to the ‘general public’,
which has an interest in investment disputes, there is
also the ‘specialist public’ (practising lawyers and
academics), which also has an interest in knowing
how treaty provisions are interpreted by arbitration
tribunals.82 Limiting disclosure effectively privileges
a small subset of the ‘specialist public’ (arbitrators
and lawyers participating in cases), whilst increasing
transparency would expand the range of actors which
could potentially participate in disputes.
However, some observers take issue with the notion
that because there is a ‘public interest’ at stake, this
justiﬁes third party participation. In this view, it is the
respondent State that should act in the public interest,
and there is no further need for any other actor to do
so. Some take this argument even further by question-
ing the legitimacy of NGOs to act in the public interest
in the ﬁrst place. Brower, for example, suggests that
‘many NGOs have very speciﬁc agendas and are not
accountable to their own members, much less to the
general public’.83
Even if NGOs do not represent the public interest,
however, other arguments have been made in favour
of third party participation. One is that third party
participation can beneﬁt arbitral decisions by adding
an extra layer of expertise or perspectives on issues
that would not be provided by the disputing parties.
For example, in Methanex, the US Government
argued that the regulation in question was an issue
of public health, while the amici raised the environ-
mental issues involved. The counter-argument to this
is that interested third parties can petition the parties
to the dispute directly to make claims on their behalf.
However, there does seem to be a value in maintaining
the independence of non-State actors in the process.84
One of the most salient claims of those that support
third party participation is that it may help to allay
public disquiet about ‘secret trade courts’,85 and
contribute to a higher level of accountability in the
arbitration process. Many authors believe that invest-
ment arbitration is either in, or is heading for, a serious
78 All of  the petitions and submissions are available at <http://
www.naftaclaims.com>.
79 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States of  America, Application for
Leave to File a Non-Disputing Party Submission by the National
Mining Association (13 October 2006), at 1, available at <http://
www.naftaclaims.com>.
80 Ibid.
81 B. Legum, ‘Trends and Challenges in Investor–State Arbitration’,
19:2 Arbitration International (2003), 143, at 145.
82 See L. Mistelis, n. 6 above, at 230.
83 C.H. Brower, ‘Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’, 36:1
Vanderbilt Journal of  Transnational Law (2003), 37, at 73.
84 See L. Mistelis, n. 6 above, at 223.
85 As an editorial famously termed them; see ‘The Secret Trade
Courts’, New York Times (27 September 2004).
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legitimacy crisis.86 In several of the cases discussed
above, the tribunals noted, in this regard, the potential
beneﬁts of providing greater openness, as well as the
potential negative implications of not doing so.
However, while this argument may hold when one is
defending increased transparency in arbitration, it may
be questioned whether the participation of private
actors (which are not accountable to the public) actually
increases the legitimacy of the process.
There appears to be a signiﬁcant amount of support
for the participation of amici and for increased trans-
parency from States and outside observers, however,
there are still those who do not view the trends in this
area as positive. One basic argument against the par-
ticipation of amicus curiae is the need to keep certain
information (e.g. ‘trade secrets’) conﬁdential. How-
ever, in practice, this can be dealt with quite easily, as
it is in other fora, by redaction in documents released
to the public and in camera restrictions when discus-
sions of this nature arise in the proceedings.
Another criticism of third party participation is that
it will increase the length and cost of arbitration.
Investor–State disputes already run, on average, several
years and entail large costs for both claimants and
respondent States.87 However, there are two counter-
arguments here: the ﬁrst is that the cost and delay in
proceedings can be minimized by clear procedures for
when and how amici may participate (e.g. only in the
merits phase, limits to length of submission, etc.); and
the second is that the tribunal is receiving additional
information at no direct cost to either party (as amici,
unlike experts, are not remunerated for their services).88
Related to the issues of the cost and the time burden
to the parties is the notion that allowing third party
participation will ‘open the ﬂoodgates’ to a large
number of submissions. However, this is unlikely
actually to occur; this has not been the experience in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or other bodies
that accept amicus curiae briefs, and the experience
thus far in investment disputes suggests that, in fact,
NGOs are likely to make joint submissions rather than
duplicative ones.
A further argument that has been made against the
participation of third parties is that it is unfair and
that it may upset the balance between the positions of
the respondent and claimant by favouring one side.
Again there are several key counter-arguments: ﬁrst,
in theory, amici are meant to provide information
which is impartial, and not intentionally to support
one party to the dispute; second, even if, in practice,
amicus curiae submissions do support the position of
one of the parties, this does not mean that the tribunal
will necessarily give more weight to that party’s posi-
tion;89 and, ﬁnally, while it is usually argued that the
participation of amici unfairly favours the respondent
State, the Glamis case illustrates that, in practice,
amici may intervene to support the claimant as well.
The position of Biwater in the above-mentioned case
in Tanzania illustrates another argument against third
party participation, although it is perhaps more closely
connected with the broader issues of transparency
and disclosure. This is the notion that opening up
arbitration to the ‘court’ of public opinion will lead to
the ‘re-politicization’ of investor–State disputes.90
While Rubens suggests that such re-politicization is
likely to be most costly for the respondent State, which
runs the risk of losing credibility as an investor-
friendly country in the face of publicity surrounding
potentially frivolous or exaggerated claims, it is clear
from the Biwater case that there is also concern on the
part of investors that they will be subjected to negative
publicity from NGO campaigns.91 However, an obvious
counter-argument is that some information about
investor–State disputes is likely to reach the public
domain whether investment arbitration is open or not.
Increases in transparency and the acceptance of third
party participation will result in the public having
access to more accurate and balanced information,
thus decreasing the opportunity for smear campaigns
against either the respondent State or the claimant.
Finally, it should be noted that the notion of permit-
ting amicus curiae submissions has also been viewed
with some scepticism in the developing world, and not
only because of concerns about the increased burden
on the parties to the dispute in terms of length and
cost of the proceedings. The South Centre, an inter-
governmental body of developing countries, argues
that ‘[p]ermitting amicus submissions effectively
disadvantages developing countries because the civil
society and industrial organizations in the developed
86 A. Afilalo, ‘Towards a Common Law of  International Investment:
How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels should solve their Legitimacy Crisis’,
17:1 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (2004),
51; J. Atik, ‘Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the
NAFTA Chapter 11 Process’, in T. Weiler (ed.), NAFTA Investment
Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects
(Transnational Publishers Inc., 2004), 135; see also C.H. Brower,
n. 83 above; and S.D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: Privatising Public International Law through
Inconsistent Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review (2005), 1521.
87 According to UNCTAD, countries can expect an average tribunal
to cost US$400,000 or more, in addition to the US$1–2 million
in legal fees. See UNCTAD, Investor–State Disputes and Policy
Implications, Ninth Session of  the Commission on Investment,
Technology and Related Financial Issues (TD/B/COM.2/62, 11
March 2005), at 7.
88 See O. Bennaim-Selvi, n. 5 above, at 804.
89 Ibid., at 805.
90 N. Rubens, ‘Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost,
for What Benefit?’, 3:3 Transnational Dispute Management (2006),
available at <http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com>.
91 Ibid.
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countries are more experienced, better organized and
equipped as well as better funded’.92 However, this
argument is not entirely convincing. First, in both the
Argentinean and Tanzanian examples, it is evident
that local NGOs were actively involved in the process
of submitting briefs. Second, in all these cases, the
local NGOs appear to have beneﬁted from support and
cooperation with northern-based NGOs, which can
provide expertise in the highly specialized area of
investment arbitration. Third, in none of the cases did
the respondent State make an objection to the submis-
sion of briefs.
It is possible that the position taken by the South Centre
is simply an extension of the stance taken by develop-
ing countries on the participation of amici in other
fora, such as the WTO, where Sornarajah suggests that
‘[t]he fear is that private interests will be given repres-
entation through the back door of amicus briefs’.93 If
so, it may be a misplaced concern, as private interests
can already use the ‘front door’ in investment arbitration,
and State and NGO positions are often complement-
ary. However, it is of course also possible that other
private interests who may be more favourable to the
claimant’s side (e.g. business associations), may wish
to involve themselves in arbitration more often in
the future, in an attempt to balance the interests
presented by third parties. This has already occurred
in one case mentioned above. As such, developing
countries’ concerns in this regard may be legitimate.
Table 1 summarizes the main arguments for and against
the participation of third parties in investor–State
disputes, as well as the counter-arguments to each.
CONCLUSIONS
With the initiatives of NGOs and the subsequent sup-
port of some States there have been changes in the
arbitration process to allow for greater transparency
and participation by third parties in investor–State
disputes. Thus far, the reforms have been largely ad
hoc, though it seems unlikely that future tribunals will
go against the general trend in this area. While there
is no formal stare decisis in investment arbitration,
tribunals often refer to past decisions made in other
cases, and diverging sharply from the reasoning of the
numerous tribunals that have laid out guidelines for
92 South Centre, Developments on Discussions for the Improvement
of  the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of
Developing Countries (SC/TADP/AN/INV/1, February 2005), at 10.
93 M. Sornarajah, ‘A Developing Country Perspective of  International
Economic Law in the Context of  Dispute Settlement’, in A.H.
Qureshi, Perspectives in International Economic Law (Kluwer Law
International, 2002), 83, at 95.
TABLE 1 ARGUMENTS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION 
ARGUMENT COUNTER-ARGUMENT
In favour of  
third party 
participation
Public interest /public purse Respondent State represents the public interest; 
NGOs not accountable
Can provide knowledge, 
expertise or different perspectives
Third parties can petition one of  the parties directly 
and can be called on as experts 
Allay public fears about secretive 
nature of  arbitration (increase 
legitimacy)
Questionable whether the participation of  actors, 
which are not accountable to the public, can increase
legitimacy
Opposed to 
third party 
participation
Trade secrets Can still be kept secret (redaction, partial in camera)
Increases burden in time and cost Burden is minimal, and can be controlled through set
guidelines on participation; the tribunal obtains more 
information at no cost (amici are not paid)
‘Opens the floodgates’ No evidence of  this in WTO or other settings, or in 
recent investment arbitration practice
Unfair to one party Third parties may participate to support either the 
claimant or the respondent State; tribunals do not 
weigh arguments more heavily just because more 
parties make them 
‘Re-politicizes’ disputes Greater transparency and the involvement of  third 
parties leads to more balanced representation of  the
case in the public sphere
Northern actors/organizations 
more capable of  intervening than 
southern ones
Southern/local actors/organizations have intervened 
in several cases; northern actors/organizations can 
support southern ones and increase their capacity to
act as amici
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the submission of briefs would require strong
justiﬁcation. Furthermore, it is evident that there is a
fervent desire within the international arbitration
community to dispel the popular concerns about the
‘secretive’ nature of the investment arbitration process.
From an environmental perspective, the changes that
have been made are generally positive, but are also
still greatly limited. While the acceptance of amicus
curiae briefs has occurred in several cases, transpar-
ency of proceedings and disclosure of documents
appears to be far more difﬁcult to achieve; the efﬁcacy
of third party participation will undoubtedly be limited
as a result.
Now that third party participation has occurred in
several environmentally relevant cases, a new area of
research in the investment-environment debate has
opened up. The focus of research in this area should
be on the impact that amicus curiae briefs have on
the outcome of speciﬁc cases, as well as the broader
awareness-raising value that they may provide. Also
required is an assessment of how the participation of
third parties affects perceptions of the legitimacy of
international investment arbitration.
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